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ABSTRACTS OF RECENT CASES
Carolyn Jaffe*
Abstractor
Admissions by Silence--Botdtott v. State, 377
S.W.2d 936 (Tenn. 1964); State v. Garcia, 199
A.2d 860 (N.J. Super. Ct., App. Div. 1964). Appellate courts of two states have recently decided
cases the outcome of which depended upon the
Validity or applicability of the rule that defendant's
silence upon being confronted with an accusation
is an admission of guilt. The question whether a
conviction for a sex crime can rest upon the uncorroborated testimony of the other party to the
sexual act was also decided in both cases.
In Boulton v. State, the Supreme Court of Tennessee deemed a 14 year old boy with whom defendant
allegedly engaged in fellatio an accomplice whose
uncorroborated testimony could not support a
conviction;'the question on appeal was whether
the boy's testimony-the only direct evidence of
defendant's guilt-was sufficiently corroborated
by other evidence. The State relied on the rule
that when an accused fails to deny an accusation
of crime, both the accusation and the fact of the
accused's failure to deny it are admissible as evidence of his acquiescence in its truth, contending
that defendant's admission by silence constituted
sufficient corroboration of the accomplice's testimony. Accepting the rule as valid without discussion, the Supreme Court of Tennessee reversed
and remanded, holding that the rule did not apply
to defendant's conduct when confronted with the
boy's accusation, inasmuch as defendant's response to the accusation-"Why did you do this
to me?"-could fairly be taken as a repudiation
or denial of the charge and could not be construed
as acquiescence in its truth. Consequently, the
accomplice's testimony was not corroborated, and
the evidence therefore did not support defendant's
conviction.
In State v. Garcia, the Appellate Division of the
Superior Court of New Jersey ruled that no corroboration was required of the testimony of the
minor victim of carnal abuse. The Court reversed
and remanded, holding that the doctrine of assenting silence-i.e., that defendant's failure to
* LL.B., LL.M., Northwestern University School of
Law. Member Illinois Bar.

deny an accusation can be considered as an admission of the'truth of the accusation or as evidence
of the accused's consciousness of guilt--did not
apply to defendant's conduct, where his immediate
reaction was denial, followed by continued silence,
and defendant was in police custody when the
confrontation took place; and consequently, the
trial court's admission in evidence of defendant's
initial denial and subsequent silence when faced
with the victim's accusation constituted reversible
error.
[Unlike the Tennessee Supreme Court in Boidton, which accepted the rule's validity, the New
Jersey court in Garciavigorously and persuasively
denounced the rule of assenting silence as being
"out of touch with" the "behavioristic sciences"
and applied it only because "constrained" to do so
by the fact that the highest court of New Jersey
"has not yet completely abrogated the principle .... "I
Alibi-People v. Torres, 37 Cal. Rptr. 889 (1964).
See Evidence, infra.
Appeal by Defendant-State v. Zecher, 128
N.W.2d 83 (Minn. 1964). Defendant was convicted of abortion. On appeal by defendant, the
State [apparently] contended that since defendant
was given a suspended sentence and subsequently
was honorably discharged from probation with restoration of her civil rights, the question whether
her conviction was proper was moot. Finding
prejudicial errors at the trial, the Supreme Court
of Minnesota reversed and remanded, holding that
in spite of defendant's having received a suspended
sentence and having had her civil rights restored,
the jury's verdict of guilty, as a practical matter,
"will have profound adverse effects upon defendant
and her children throughout their lives," and
therefore the questions on appeal were not moot.
Appeal by the Government-United States v.
Tane, 329 F.2d 848 (2d Cir. 1964). See Wiretapping
-Standing To Object, infra.

ABSTRACTS OF RECENT CASES
Arrest-Rogers v. United States, 330 F.2d 535
(5th Cir. 1964). See Confessions, infra.

Arrest, Search and Seizure--Raif v. State, 136
S.E.2d 169 (Ga. App. 1964). Defendants were
convicted of burglary. On writ of error, the Coutt
of Appeals of Georgia certified questions to the
Georgia Supreme Court which were returned unanswered. Defendants contended that evidence
obtained as a product of their illegal arrests was
erroneously used against them at trial. The Court
of Appeals of Georgia reversed, holding that since
the arresting officers had no more than a suspicion
that defendants may have committed some unknown crime, defendants' arrests were illegal, inasmuch as "there is no authority in Georgia under
which a citizen may be arrested without a warrant
and held for investigation to determine if he has
committed some crime" merely because thi arresting officer has such a suspicion; and that since
the arrests were illegal, the evidence in question
was suppressible as a fruit of an illegal search and
seizure even though defendants turned over the
evidence to the officers, inasmuch as a prisoner in
illegal police custody is in no position to refuse to
comply with the commands or requests of the
officers. [The Court in so holding has adopted the
rule that one in illegal police custody is conclusi -ely
presumed to be incapable of giving "voluntary
consent; query whether this rule would be held
applicable to "voluntary" statements.]

Arrest, Search and Seizure-Cannon v. State,
200 A.2d 919 (Md. 1964). Defendant was convicted
of unlawful possession of narcotics. On appeal,
defendant contended that the tangible evidence
used against him at trial was obtained as the result of an illegal search and seizure. The Court of
Appeals of Maryland affirmed, holding that where
the arresting officer's personal observations together with his experience as a narcotics squad
officer constituted probable cause to believe defendant was or recently had been in illegal possession of narcotics, the officer's search of defendant's person was lawful as incident to arrest
even though it preceded arrest, inasmuch as "it
is immaterial that a search ... preceded his arrest
so long as the requisite probable cause to arrest
existed [before the search] and the search is not
too remote [from the arrest] in time or place."
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Arrest, Search and Seizure-State v. Burnett,
201 A.2d 39 (N.J. 1964). Defendant was convicted
of possessing lottery slips, and the Appellate Division of the New Jersey Superior Court affirmed.
On appeal, defendant contended that the State
was obliged to reveal the identity of the informant
upon whose information defendant's arrest and
search without warrant were based. The Supreme
Court of New Jersey affirmed for the reason given
by the Appellate Division-viz., that the question
had not properly been raised, since defendant failed
to demand disclosure and move to strike the related testimony if disclosure was not made-but
dealt [in what in effect is an advisory opinion]
with the issue left undecided by the Appellate
Division. The Court stated that disclosure of the
identity of an informer upon whose information
an arrest or search-with or without warrant-is
based should be required only if the judge who
hears a motion to suppress decides that such disclosure is necessary in order to pass upon the question of probable cause. The Court sets forth federal
and state law in this area and discusses the conflicting policies of the informer privilege and the
fourth amendment.
Arrest, Search and Seizure-State v. Bibbo, 198
A.2d 810 (N.J. Super. Ct., App. Div. 1964). Defendant was convicted of possession of lottery
slips. On appeal, defendant contended that the
trial court erroneously denied his motion to suppress the evidence used against him. The Appellate
Division of the New Jersey Superior Court affirmed, holding that where the arresting officer
had the right, as a member of the public, to enter
the public portion of a hat store, the fact that the
officer was there pursuant to a defective search
warrant did not make his presence any less lawful;
that therefore the officer lawfully picked up from
the floor of the public part of the stor6 a lottery
slip which defendant dropped when he saw police
officers; and consequently, defendant's arrest and
search, which disclosed additional lottery slips,
were lawful, since the slip dropped on the floor
revealed the commission of a crime in the officer's
presence. The Court noted that defendant's argument that he had standing to object to the search
of the store merely because he was lawfully on the
premises was erroneous, since one has no standing
to object unless the seizure invades a right of
privacy belonging to him. Having held the arrest,
search and seizure to be lawful, however, the Court
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did not decide whether defendant had the requisite
standing.

Change of Venue-Hanley v. State, 391 P.2d
865 (Nev. 1964). See Prejudicial Publicity, infra.

Arrest, 'Search and Seizure--Mfurphy v. State,
Circumstantial Evidence-State v. Regazzi, 379
378 S.W.2d 73 (Tex. Ct. Crim. App. 1964). De- S.W.2d 575 (Mo. 1964); Monts v. State, 379 S.W.2d
fendant was convicted of unlawful possession of a 34 (Tenn. 1964). See Evidence-Circumstantial
dangerous drug. On appeal, defendant contended Evidence, infra.
that evidence obtained as the result of a search
Confessions-United States v. Mihalopoulos, 228
incident to her unlawful arrest without a warrant
was admitted against her at the trial. The Texas F. Supp. 994 (D.D.C. 1964). Defendant was conCourt of Criminal Appeals reversed and remanded, victed of housebreaking and larceny. On motion
holding ti.t where the car in which defendant
for new trial, defendant contended that his written
was riding was stopped for a traffic violation, and confession had been obtained during a period of
defendant failed to answer the officer's (undis- detention violative of FED. R. Csmm. P. 5(a). The
closed) qifettion and did not get out of the car at United States District Court for the District of
his request; defendant's arrest.without a warrant, Columbia denied the motion, holding that where
which occuired when the officer, after the afore- defendant voluntarily accompanied officers to
mentioned events, pulled her out of the car, was fpolice headquarters about 2:30 p.m. on a Saturunlawful;" and consequently, the evidence ob- day, was in fact-and knew he was-free to leave
tained as a 'result of a search of defendant's purse until 10:15 p.m., was not placed under arrest until
pursuant to her unlawful arrest was inadmissible.
10:15 p.m. when he orally confessed, signed a
With regard to the State's contention that the written statement at 12:20 a.m. Sunday, and was
arrest wai 'lawful -as an arrest without Warrant
arraigned before a magistrate who came from his
of one fotffid drunk in a public place, the Court home to the station at 2:05 a.m., there was no
noted that, even assuming that the arresting period of unnecessary delay between arrest and
officer's opinion that defendant was drunk was arraignment. The Court noted that since court
supported by the facts, this opinion was based in sessions are not held in the District of Columbia
part on her conduct after she had been pulled from on Saturdays, the result would be the same even
the car-i.e., arrested.
accepting the theory, which the Court did not,
that defendant was placed under arrest at 2:30
Assault'---Intent To Kill-State v. Ferguson, 135 p.m. rather than at 10:15 p.m. on Saturday, inasS.E.2d 626 (N.C. 1964). Defendant was convicted much as a defendant.has no right to be arraigned
of assault with a deadly weapon with intent to at a time when no magistrate is regularly required
kill, inflicting serious injury. On writ of error, de- to sit. The Court further noted that District of
Columbia Court of Appeals cases are unsettled in
fendant contended that the "whiplash" injury
this
area, and that the Circuits are divided in
suffered by the prosecution witness when deapplying
the Mallory rule, intimating that it would
fendant rammed his truck into the witness's car
was not a "serious injury" within N.C. GEN. STAT. be appropriate for the United States Supreme
§14-32, and that the jury was erroneously in- Court to-take a Rule 5(a) case on certiorari. The
structed as to the element of "intent to kill." The Court discusses numerous pertinent federal cases.
Supreme Court of North Carolina ordered a new
Confessions-Mott v. Superior Court, 38 Cal.
trial, holding that whether or not a "whiplash"
Rptr.
247 (Dist. Ct. App. 1964). See Indictment
injury is a "serious injury" was a jury question
and
Information,
infra.
to be determined in light of the facts of each particular case; but that the trial court's instruction,
allowing the jury to find an intent to kill if deConfessions-Roberts v. State, 164 So. 2d 817
fendant intended either to kill or to inflict great
(Fla. 1964). Defendants were convicted of first
bodily harm was prejudicially errom-us, inasmuch
degree murder without recommendation of mercy.
as intent to kill was an essential e'enent of the On appeal, defendant Roberts contended, inter
charge against defendant which cou;,: ot be es- alia, that his confession should not have been
tablished merely by proof of intent to inflict serious admitted against him, since it was obtained by
injury.
prolonged and excessive interrogation which over-
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came his capacity to resist. The Supreme Court
of Florida affirmed, holding that since the trial
court properly investigated the question of voluntariness as a condition to admission of the confession and then correctly submitted it to the jury
for determination of credibility, there was no error,
inasmuch as the mere fact that defendant confessed 16 hours after his arrest and before being
brought to a magistrate did not destroy the validity
of the confession found by the trial court to have
been freely and voluntarily given and then by
the jury to have been credible.
Confessions-Gore v. State, 163 So. 2d 37 (Fla.
Dist. Ct. App. 1964). Defendant was convicted
of manslaughter. On appeal, defendant contended
that the trial court committed fundamental error
by admitting in evidence his oral confession, inasmuch as it was obtained before arraignment and
after post-arrest detention of two weeks. 'The
Florida District Court of Appeal affirmed, holding
that in the absence of any prejudice shown to
have been suffered by defendant by reason of the
State's failure to comply with the prompt arraignment statute, defendant's extra-judicial confession,
since not shown to have been coerced, was properly
admitted, inasmuch as failure to comply with the
terms of the statute "will not, of itself, render an
extra-judicial cohfession inadmissible." The Court
noted that while its decision was the only possible
one under. Florida Supreme Court precedents,
"Were this the first time that the subject statute
had been presented to an appellate court ...

we

would be constrained to ... hold that the failure
"of arresting officers to reasonably comply with the
provisions of the statute will render an admission
or confession against interest during such period
of incarceration inadmissible. We think this is the
purpose the legislature had in mind in passing such
a statute and that a flouting of same by law enforcement officers... should not be sanctioned
any more than the violation of the criminal laws
... by those charged with such offenses." One of

the three judges concurred specially, not joining
in this dictum.
Confessions- Bean v. State, 199 A.2d 773 (Md.
1964). Defendant was convicted of rape. On appeal, defendant contended that his confession was
erroneously admitted in evidence, inasmuch as it
was not voluntarily made and was obtained while
he was being illegally detained. The Court of Ap-
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peals of Maryland affirmed, holding that where
the evidence showed that defendant never asked
for food or drink, was given an opportunity to
sleep for at least five hours before he was questioned, and did not request an opportunity to
consult with counsel or family, the trial court's
finding that defendant's confession was voluntary
could not be said to be an abuse of discretion, even
though at the time defendant was 15 years old
with an I.Q. of 74; and even if defendant's detention by the police was illegal because no waiver
of jurisdiction from the juvenile court had been
obtained, an illegal detention will not invalidate a
confession that is in fact voluntary [citing Prescoe
v. State, 191 A.2d 226 (Md. 1963), abstracted at
55 J. Cman. L., C. & P.S. 117 (1964)]. Three judges
dissented, stating that it could not realistically be
said that defendant's confession was obtained
under a situation where the totality of the circumstances evidenced that it was freely and voluntarily made.
Confessions-State v. Hoyt, 128 N.W.2d 645
(Wis. 1964). See Homicide-Manslaughter, infra.
Cruel and Unusual Punishment-Maaffey v.
State, 392 P.2d 279 (Idaho 1964). See Habeas
Corpus, infra.
Derivative Evidence-Edwards v. United States,
330 F.2d 849 (D.C. Cir. 1964). Defendants
Edwards and Gross were convicted by the United
States District Court for the District of Columbia
of robbery by force and violence. On appeal by
Edwards alone, defendant contended that the trial
court improperly refused to exclude testimony of
the complaining witness and of one Berry, a participant in the robbery who was dealt with in the
Juvenile Court rather than the District Court,
inasmuch as their testimony constituted derivative
evidence of defendant's and Gross's confessions,
which could not be used as evidence in the District.
Court because they were made while defendants
were in the custody of the Juvenile Court and
before that Court had waived exclusive jurisdiction [citing and relying upon Harling v. United
States, 295 F.2d 161 (D.C. Cir. 1961), abstracted
at 53 J. CRim. L., C. & P.S. 223 (1962)]. The
Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia
Circuit affirmed, holding that where the trial court
properly excluded all the confessions made while
defendants were in exclusive juvenile custody, and
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the complaining witness was cautioned out of the
presence of the jury not to mention that he had
seen or interviewed defendants there, his testimony
concerning the facts of the crime and his identification of defendants in open court as the perpetrators
thereof satisfied the requirements of the Harling
case (based upon fundamental fairness to juveniles
and insulation of juvenile court system from adult
system) while not depriving the robbery victim
of the opportunity to state his grievances in court;
and that Smith v. United States, 324 F.2d 879 (D.C.
Cir. 1963), abstracted at 55 J. CRIt. L., C. & P.S.
250 (1964), was controlling, compelling the conclusion that, although Berry's identity was discovered as a result of the confessions which could
not themselves be introduced in evidence in the
adult criminal prosecution, the fact that qualities
of individual human personality-wil, perception,
memory, and volition-played a role in determining whether Berry would testify constituted
sufficient attenuation to regard the testimony as
independent of the inadmissible confessions.

it to determine whether it contained the statement
sought, the trial court's ruling denying defendant
the right to examine the entire file was technically
correct, inasmuch as defendant had no right to
inspect the entire file, and the court was under no
duty to examine it in the absence of a defense request; but though such a holding would be technically correct, it would be unfair to. defendant
under the circumstances of this case, since the
critical issue was the identification of defendant,
and the opportunity of the prosecutrix, the only
identification witness, to observe defedlart.at the
time bf the alleged crime was limitei by lack of
light and time, and therefore it.Was. of great importance to defendant that he .b. permitted to
examine any statement made by her for possible
use for impeachment purposes; and where no one
knew whether the police department fae,.ontained
a statement given by prosecutrix, the.ca.we would
be remanded to the trial court with directions as
set forth above, since "the interests 9fjustice
require a resolution of this question."

Derivative Evidence-United States v. Tane,
329 F.2d 848 (2d Cir. 1964). See WiretappingStanding To Object, infra.

Double Jeopardy-State ex rd. James v.
Williams, 164 So. 2d 873 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
1964). Relator brought an original proceeding to
prohibit respondent judge from trying him upon
Count I of an information charging conspiracy to
commit abortion, contending that to try him
would violate the constitutional prohibition against
double jeopardy. The Florida District Court of
Appeal made absolute the rule nisi in prohibition
and prohibited respondent judge from proceeding
to try relator on Count I, holding that where
relator had been informed against for (Count I)
conspiracy to commit abortion and (Count II)
attempted abortion, the State elected to proceed
only upon Count II after the jury was impanelled
and sworn, and relator was acquitted on Count II,
relator had been placed in jeopardy on both counts
during the original trial; and consequently, relator
could not now be tried on the conspiracy count.

Detention-Gore v. State, 163 So. 2d 37 (Fla.
Dist. Ct. App. 1964). See Confessions, supra.
Discovery-People v. Wright, 198 N.E.2d 316
(Ill. 1964). Defendant was convicted of rape. On
writ of error, defendant contended that the trial
court committed prejudicial error when it refused
to allow him to examine a police file in order to
ascertain whether it contained a statement of the
prosecutrix which could be used for impeachment
purposes. The Supreme Court of Illinois remanded
with directions that the trial court examine the
police file and, if the file did contain a statement
by prosecutrix which could be used for impeachment purposes, vacate judgment and grant a new
trial, or, if it did not, make a finding of fact to that
effect and enter a new final judgment of conviction.
The Court held that where the police file was in
the trial court in response to defendant's subpoena,
it was undisputed that the prosecutrix had signed
a statement which at one time was in possession
of the State, the prosecution in good faith denied
possession of the statement at the time of trial,
and defendant repeatedly demanded to inspect the
file but did not request that the trial court examine

Evidence-People v. Torres, 37 Cal. Rptr. 889
(1964). Defendant was convicted on two counts of
selling heroin. On appeal, defendant contended that
the trial court committed prejudicial error when it
refused to allow him to introduce testimony relevant to his alibi defense. The Supreme Court of
California reversed as to both counts, holding that
where defendant testified that he and his wife attended a certain movie at the State Theater on
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Jan. 25, the evening when the crime charged in
Count II was allegedly committed, and that it had
rained that night, the theater manager testified
that the motion picture defendant said he saw at
his theater was shown there from Jan. 25 through
Jan. 31, and a meteorologist testified that it had
rained on fan. 25, it was prejudicial error to refuse
to allow defendant to establish, through the
meteorologist, that it did not rain on any other
day while that movie was being shown at the
State Theater, since this refusal amounted to exclusion of substantial evidence in support of the
alibi to Cduht II; and since preventing defendant
from thus stabllshing the truth of his alibi as to
Count II A1s0 had the effect of preventing him from
establishiig his truthfulness, an "atmosphere of
falsity infected his whole defense," and defendant
was prejudiced as to Count I as well; therefore,
both comits must be reversed.
Evidence---Burden of Proof of InsanityBradford v. "'Slate, 200 A.2d 150 (Md. 1964). See
Insanity-Burden of Proof, infra.
Evidence-:-Circumstantial Evidence-State v.
Regazzi, 379'S.W.2d 575 (Mo. 1964); Monts v.
State, 370 S.W.2d 34 (Tenn. 1964). The highest
courts of to states have recently ruled on the
necessity of giving an instruction on circumstantial
evidence where the evidence against defendant is
wholly or partly circumstantial.
In Stdte-D. Regazzi, defendant requested the trial
court to give an instruction defining direct and circumstantial evidence as follows: "Direct evidence
is when a witness testifies directly of his own
knowledge of the main facts or facts to be proven.
Circumstantial evidence is proof of certain facts
and circuilistances in a certain case, from which the
jury may ifnfer other and connected facts which
usually and reasonably follow, according to the
common experiences of mankind." He also asked
the trial court to state in the same charge that
while "A crime may be proven by circumstantial
evidence,.., the facts and circumstances in evidence should be consistent with each other and
consistent with the guilt of the defendant, and inconsistent with any reasonable theory of the defendant's innocence." The Supreme Court of
Missouri reversed defendant's burglary conviction
because of the trial court's refusal to grant the
proffered instruction, holding that an instruction
on circumstantial evidence must be given where, as
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here, the evidence bearing unon defendant's guilt
was wholly circumstantidi.
In Monts v. Stale, the Supreme Court of Tennessee had the opportunity to distifiguish between
sua sponte and requested instructions where the
evidence of guilt was both direct and circumstantial, and further to distinguish such cases from
those involving only circumstantial evidence. The
evidence of felony murder against both defendants
was of both types; defendant Monts failed to request the court to charge the jury on the law of
circumstantial evidence, while defendant West
did make such request. Noting by way of dictum
and contrast that if the evidence is wholly circumstantial a trial court must on its own motion instruct the jury on the law of circumstantial evidence in absence of a request for such a charge,
inasmuch as in such a case a circumstantial evidence charge is "fundamental," and failure so to
instruct is reversible error, the Supreme Court of
Tennessee affirmed Monts' conviction, holding
that where the evidence is both direct and circumstantial, the subject matter of a circumstantial
evidence charge is not fundamental to the defense
and hence failure to give such an instruction in the
absence of a request therefor is not reversible
error. The Court reversed West's conviction on
the ground that refusal to give a requested circumstantial evidence instruction where there is both
direct and circumstantial evidence of guilt constitutes reversible error.
Evidence-Expert Testimony-People v. Clay,
38 Cal. Rptr. 431 (Dist. Ct. App. 1964). Defendants Clay and Davis were convicted of second
degree burglary and grand theft. On appeal by
defendant Clay alone, defendant contended that
the trial court erred in allowing a police officer to
testify as an expert witness concerning the crime
of "till tapping" in general and as to defendant's
guilt in particular. Noting that the question
whether an expert witness can testify as to the
modus operandi of till tapping was one of first impression in California, the District Court of Appeal
affirmed, holding that the decisive question was
whether the jury can receive appreciable help from
the proffered expert witness; that the subject
matter of Inspector Reed's testimony relating the
modus operaui of till tapping, a form of theft
whereby one person diverts a store cashier's attention by making various purchases-defendant
Clay's alleged role in the instant case-while
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another person steals from the open cash register,
was sufficiently beyond common experience that
the expert's testimony would assist the jury in
determining whether defendant's seemingly innocent conduct might have been part of a scheme
known as "till tapping"; and that although a witness cannot express an opinion as to a defendant's
guilt or innocence, the result of the hypothetical
question put to Reed was to place before the jury
his opinion that defendant's and Davis's conduct
was consistent with the procedure of a till tapping
operation, and thus it was a permissible opinion
even though it coincided with an ultimate issue
of fact.

trials as to the other defendants, holding that
where the district attorney introduced in evidence
samples of twine found on the kidnap victim and
in the car in which two of the defendants were
apprehended, and he referred to the two samples as
"the same similar twine," knowing but not revealing that the State Police Crime Laboratory
had analyzed the samples and rendered an opinion
that they differed as to the number of strands and
diameter, defendants were deprived of their right
to a fair and impartial trial. The Court noted that
it is no answer to argue that defense counsel could
have asked whether a test had been conducted on
the exhibits, since such procedure would "'run the
risk of developing affirmative answers ,that would
Evidence-Order of Proof-Nassif v. District readily seal the doom of his client.'"
of Columbia, 201 A.2d 519 (D.C. Ct. App. 1964).
Defendant was convicted of indecent exposure. On
Habeas Corpus-United States ex rd. Hall v.
appeal, defendant contended that the trial court
Illinois, 329 F.2d 354 (7th Cir. 1964). See Enerred in requiring him, before calling any witnesses
trapment, supra.
for the defense, to elect whether he would testify,
and if he elected to testify, to testify before calling
any other defense witness. The District of ColumHabeas Corpus-Mahaffeyv. State, 392 P.2d 279
bia Court of Appeals reversed and ordered a new (Idaho 1964). Petitioner was convicted of robbery
trial, holding that although in that jurisdiction the and escape. On appeal from the trial court's denial
order of proof in civil cases, and in criminal cases so of his two petitions for writ of habeas corpus, petifar as witnesses are concerned, is within the discre- tioner contended that he had been subjected to
tion of the trial court, that rule must not apply to cruel and unusual punishment while incarcerated
the defendant in a criminal case, in light of the pursuant to the judgments of conviction; respondmany factors beyond the trial court's control which ent State contended that habeas corpus would not
cause a defendant and his attorney to decide lie in absence of petitioner's contention that the
whether the defendant will testify, and, if so, at sentence was illegal'or that the sentencing court
what stage of the defense; and consequently, the lacked jurisdiction. The Supreme Court of Idaho
ruling complained of, which required defendant to reversed and remanded, holding that since by
testify as the first defense witness, if at 'all, con- Idaho precedent and statutory authority Idaho
stituted reversible error.
courts are not limited on habeas corpus proceedings to remand or discharge of the prisoner, but
Evidence-Suppression by Prosecution-Com- may "dispose of such party as the justice of the
inmrwealth v. Miller, 201 A.2d 256 (Pa. Super. Ct. case may require" [Idaho Code §1942121, and
1964). Defendants were found guilty of conspiracy since failure to hold that habeas corpus may issue
to commit robbery, robbery, and kidnapping, and in the instant type of case would mean that pethe trial court granted defendant Townsend's
titioner has a constitutionally protected right
motion in arrest of judgment, refusing the other against cruel and unusual punishment without a
defendants' motions for new trial and in arrest of remedy to enforce it, habeas corpus was an availjudgment. On appeal by the Commonwealth from able remedy; and since petitioner had alleged facts
the order arresting judgment as to Townsend, and which went far beyond the "mere prison discipline"
on appeal by the remaining defendants, defendants over which the courts lack jurisdiction, and such
contended that the district attorney knowingly allegations must be taken as true for present pursuppressed important exculpatory evidence. The poses, the trial court's orders denying the petitions
Superior Court of Pennsylvania affirmed the order for writs of habeas corpus would be reversed and
in arrest of judgment as to Townsend for in- the cause remanded [presumably for evidentiary
sufficient evidence and reversed and ordered new hearing on the petitions] to the trial court.
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Homicide-Felony Murder-People v. Mitchell,
38 Cal. Rptr. 726 (1964). Defendant was convicted
of felony murder and sentenced to death. On automatic appeal, defendant contended that since his
attempted surrender terminated the robbery, the
homicide which occurred thereafter did not amount
to felony murder; and that the trial court erred
in instructing the jury to consider, in the penalty
phase of the case, the possibilities that a defendant sentenced to death or life imprisonment may
be pardoned or have his sentence reduced by certain authorities and that a prisoner serving a life
sentence is eligible for parole. The Supreme
Court of California reversed and remanded on
the issue of penalty only, citing People v. Morse,
36 Cal. Rptr. 201, abstracted at 55 J. Cam. L.,
C. & P.S. 262 (1964), and People v. Hines, 37
Cal. Rptr. 622, abstracted at 55 J. Cam. L.,
C. & P.S. 390 (1964), because the jury was improperly allowed to consider prejudicial matter
in determining penalty, but affirmed the judgment in all other respects, holding that under
the felony murder rule, CAL. PEN. CODE §189,that a killing committed in the perpetration of or
attempt. to perpetrate certain crimes, including
robbery, is first degree murder-proof of a strict
causal relationship between the felony and homicide is not required, and it is sufficient to show that
the felony and the homicide were parts of a -ontinuous transaction; that even if defendant's
version of how he made a futile attempt to surrender were true, this attempt was not a sufficient
intervening act to terminate the robbery for purposes of the felony murder doctrine; and consequently, the robbery and homicide were parts of a
continuous transaction, and the homicide therefore
constituted first degree murder.
Homicide-Involuntary Manslaughter-Lambert
v. Commonwealth, 377 S.W.2d 76 (Ky. 1964). See
Statutory Construction-Manslaughter, infra.
Homicide-Manslaughter-State v. Hoyt, 128
N.W.2d 645 (Wis. 1964). Defendant was convicted of second degree murder. The Supreme
Court of Wisconsin reversed, but granted the
State's motion for rehearing. On rehearing, defendant contended that the trial court erred in
refusing to instruct the jury with regard to manslaughter; that a coerced confession was erroneously used as evidence against her; and that police
officers were improperly allowed to testify concern-
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ing what they observed after unlawfully entering
her home. The Supreme Court of Wisconsin withdrew its former opinion and again reversed and
ordered a new trial, holding that since, in determining whether a reasonable person would be so
provoked as to reduce what would otherwise be
murder to manslaughter, the jury should consider
not only the victim's conduct toward defendant
immediately prior to the killing but also prior
relations between them which could magnify the
provocation of the immediate conduct, the trial
court should have submitted the issue of manslaughter to the jury, inasmuch as the jury could
have found sufficient provocation from the evidence if allowed to consider prior relations between
the victim and defendant; that where defendant's
written confession was made at a very late hour
when she was confronted with the prospect of
being deprived of sleep, and after the interrogating
officers continued to question her in disregard of her
attorney's advice, defendant's statement could
not be said to have resulted from her "free and
deliberate choice" and therefore was erroneously
admitted as evidence; and where the police officers,
who had been informed that a shooting had occurred at defendant's address, saw through the
window a body on the floor, and no one responded
when they rang the doorbell, it was the officers'
duty in this emergency situation to enter for the
purpose of aiding the victim if still alive, and hence
the officers lawfully entered defendant's home, and
were properly permitted to testify as to their observations therein. Judge Wilkie concurred in the
result, but suggested that instead of retaining the
objective test of provocation in the manslaughter
context, the trier of fact "must focus upon the
defendant's total life experience in relation to the
victim, and attempt to understand, in emotional
as well as cognitive terms, the defendant's feelings
toward the victim," and therefore would advocate
adoption of the ALI's Model Penal Code's definition of manslaughter.
Homicide-Self-Defense-Pate v. State, 163 So.
2d 645 (Ala. App. 1964). Defendant was convicted
of second degree murder. On appeal, defendant
contended, inter alia, that the trial court's refusal
to charge the jury that the State had the burden
of proving that defendant, who claimed selfdefense, was not free from fault in bringing on the
affray. The Court of Appeals of Alabama reversed
and remanded, holding that where defendant
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claimed self-defense, the State bore the burden of
proving beyond a reasonable doubt as an element
of the offense that defendant was not free from
fault in bringing about the difficulty; and consequently, the trial court's refusal to give the proffered instruction constituted reversible error. The
Court also found that the trial court erred in refusing to give certain other requested instructions
pertaining to presumption of innocence and reasonable doubt.

Indictment and Information-State v. Hochmuth,
127 N.W.2d 658 (Iowa 1964). Defendant was convicted of receiving stolen goods. On appeal, defendant contended that the jury was erroneously
instructed to convict if it found that defendant
"bought, received, or aided in concealing" the
goods, inasmuch as the information alleged only
that deftndant received the goods. The Supreme
Court of Iowaxeversed and remanded, holding that
where the statute [IOWA CODE §712.1 (1962)],
captioned "Receiving Stolen Goods," covered
Immunity Statutes-Afurphy v. Waterfront buying, receiving, and aiding in concealing stolen
goods, it was unnecessary that the information
Comm'n, 84 Sup. Ct. 1594 (1964). See Self-Inallege the means by which the offense was comcrimination, infra.
mitted; but where the State chose to specify in
the information the manner in which the crime
Improper Conduct by Prosecutor-Kuk v. State, was committed, i.e., the information alleged that
392 P.2d 630 (Nev. 1964). See Insanity, infra.
defendant "did receive" the goods, defendant
could not properly be convicted upon a finding
that the crime was committed by means not alImproper Conduct by Prosecutor--Commonleged, i.e., buying or aiding in concealing the
wealth v. Miller, 201 A.2d 256 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1964).
See Evidence-Suppression by Prosecution, supra. goods; and therefore, since the instruction objected
to permitted a finding of guilt upon a state of facts
not charged in the information, the instruction
Indictment and Information-United States v.
was prejudicial and defendant's conviction could
Tane, 329 F.2d 848 (2d Cir. 1964). See Wiretapping
not stand.
-Standing To Object, infra.
Indictment and Information-Molt v. Superior
Court, 38 Cal. Rptr. 247 (Dist. Ct. App. 1964).
Petitioner and others were indicted by the grand
jury and charged with having conspired to accept
bets. Petitioner's motion to set aside the indictment
was denied. On application for writ of prohibition
to prevent the Superior Court in and for Orange
County, California, from trying him, petitioner
contended that the indictment was not supported
by competent or sufficient evidence. The California District Court of Appeal issued a peremptory writ of prohibition, holding that unless
petitioner's confession was proper evidence before
the grand jury, there was insufficient evidence to
indict petitioner; that since a grand jury may
receive only the same type of evidence which a
court of law may entertain-i.e., legally competent
evidence-a foundation of voluntariness must be
established before a confession may be heard by a
grand jury; and consequently, since no such foundation was laid as to petitioner's confession, there
was no competent or sufficient evidence to support
the indictment, and petitioner could not be
prosecuted pursuant thereto.

Indictment and Information-State v. Blue Fox
Bar, Inc., 128 N.W.2d 561 (S.D. 1964). Defendant
corporation, holder of a liquor license, was convicted of permitting persons under the age of 21 on
the licensed premises and selling intoxicating
liquor to persons under 21. On appeal, defendant
contended that the trial court erred in denying its:
motion to quash the information and in not sustaining its objection to introduction of evidence
thereunder, inasmuch as the information failed to
set forth the name(s) of the person(s) upon or
against whom the alleged offenses were committed.
The Supreme Court of South Dakota reversed,
holding that to satisfy state constitutional and
statutory requirements, an information must
apprise a defendant with reasonable certainty of
the nature of the accusation against him so that he
may prepare his defense and plead the judgment as
a bar to. subsequent prosecution for the same
offense; that under this test, with regard to the
offenses charged, the names of the purchaser and
the person alleged to have been unlawfully permitted on the premises are essential; and cdnsequently, failure to set forth these names in the
information compelled reversal.
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Indictment and Information-Gaskin v. State,
163 So. 2d 220 (Ala. App. 1964); Criddle v. State,
165 So. 2d 339 (Miss. 1964). Appellate courts in
two states have recently reversed theft convictions
on the ground that there was a fatal variance between the indictment and proof as to the name of
the victim.
In Gaskin v. State, the Court of Appeals of
Alabama reversed and remanded defendant's conviction for grand larceny, holding that in light of
the purpose of alleging and proving ownership of
stolen goods-to obviate the rightful owner's
consent to the asportation and to identify the
offense so as to prevent double jeopardy-there
was a fatal variance where the indictment charged
that defendant stole goods from "Gulf Mills Inc.,
a corporation," and the evidence showed that the
store used the trade name "Gulf Mills Department
Store."
In the Criddle case, the Supreme Court of
Mississippi reversed defendant's forgery conviction where the indictment charged that certain
corporations were intended to be defrauded, and
there was no proof that either firm was a corporation. While all the Judges joined in the Court's
opinion because a Mississippi case directly in point
compelled reversal on the variance issue, two
Judges indicated that since a copy of the allegedly
forged instrument was set out in the indictment,
no possibility of double jeopardy existed; and thus
the reason for the rule did not apply to the facts
of this case.
Informers-State v. Burnett, 201 A.2d 39 (N.J.
1964). See Arrest, Search and Seizure, supra.
Insanity-Whie v. Rhay, 390 P.2d 535 (Wash.
1964). Petitioner was convicted of first and second
degree murder and received the death sentence for
the first degree count. The Supreme Court of
Washington, reaffirming the sole applicability of
the M'Naghten rule to the question of criminal
responsibility, affirmed. State v. White, 374 P.2d
942 (1962), abstracted at 54 J. CRIu. L., C. & P.S.
191 (1963). The Washington Supreme Court
denied rehearing, and the United States Supreme
Court denied certiorari. On original application for
writ of habeas corpus, petitioner asserted that the
death sentence was void because (1) the fourteenth
amendment prohibited the state from executing
him for an act requiring criminal intent committed
when petitioner, because of life-long mental illness,
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was unable to exercise free will in relation to that
act; (2) petitioner was unable effectively to assist
at his trial because of mental illness; and (3)
the prosecutor had sole discretion whether to elect
that the jury be instructed that the State was
demanding the death penalty constituted a denial
of petitioner's rights to due process of law and equal
protection of the laws. The Supreme Court of
Washington denied the writ, holding that petitioner was denied no fourteenth amendment rights
by way of the trial court's refusal to instruct the
jury in terms of the Durham rule, irresistable impulse, or any other non-M'Naghten test of legal
insanity, either as a defense to the charges or to be
applied in determining penalty; that the record
showed petitioner's second ground-that he was
unable effectively to assist in his defense-to be
without merit; and that since the applicable statute
required that the jury return a special verdict as
to penalty in every first degree murder case, the
prosecutor did not have sole discretion to elect
that the jury be instructed that the State was
demanding the death penalty. With regard to
petitioner's first contention, he further argued that
imposition of the death penalty upon him contravened the mandate of Robinson v. California,
370 U.S. 660, abstracted at 53 J. CRim. L., C. &
P.S. 492 (1962)-that a person not be punished
for a status amounting to a disease-inasmuch as
he was unable to refrain, because of mental disease,
from committing the act for which he was seatenced to death. The Court answered by stating
that in Robinson, mere status was held unpunishable, whereas here, petitioner's actions, not his
status of mental illness, were being punished.
Judge Hill would remand to the trial court for
imposition of life imprisonment, stating that
while M'Naghten should be retained as the test of
criminal responsibility in determining guilt or
innocence, all psychiatric evidence should be considered by the jury in determining the question of
penalty; he considered the trial court's refusal so
to instruct a violation of due process because such
refusal "is a violation of the fundamental principles
of justice which lie at the base of our civil and
political institutions." Judges Hunter and Finley,
in separate dissents, would remand for retrial of the
whole cause (there being no procedure in Washington for a trial on the issue of penalty alone), since
in their view petitioner was not accorded due
process by strict adherence to M'Naghten. Further,
Judge Hunter agreed with petitioner's contention
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that the Robinsm principle prohibited the state
from punishing him at all, in the light of the overwhelming psychiatric evidence that petitioner was
medically insane and not in control of his behavior.
Insanity-Kuk v. State, 392 P.2d 630 (Nev.
1964). Defendant was convicted of first degree
murder. On appeal, defendant contended, interalia,
that a newspaper story appearing while the trial
was in progress infected the fairness of his trial,
and that the jury was improperly informed, via
instructions by the trial court and closing argument
by the prosecution, of the consequences of a verdict
of not guilty by reason of insanity. The Supreme
Court of Nevada affirmed, holding that while
"This kind of irresponsible reporting frequently
impedes the administration of justice," the news
story complained of, implying that a verdict of
not guilty by reason of insanity would allow
defendant soon to "roam the streets," did not
render his trial unfair, inasmuch as no juror responded affirmatively to the trial court's question
the day after the story appeared whether any
had read it; that since the instruction complained
of merely informed the jury, in the substantial
language of the statute, of the consequences
[mandatory commitment until recovery of sanity]
of a verdict of not guilty by reason of insanity,
such instruction was proper even though defendant
did not desire that it be given; and that although
the prosecutor's closing argument embodying the
substance of the instruction was phrased in an
inappropriately sarcastic manner, defendant failed
to object to the statement, and the Supreme
Court's review of the entire record caused the
Court to conclude that the remark did not affect
defeadant's substantial rights. The Court distinguished the question whether a jury should be
instructed of the consequences of a verdict of not
guilty by reason of insanity from the question
whether it should be instructed regarding the
possibility of parole after a finding of guilty, citing
People v. Morse, 36 Cal. Rptr. 201, abstracted at
55 J. Cmns. L., C. & P.S. 262 (1964).
Insanity-Burden of Proof-Bradford v. State,
200 A.2d 150 (Md. 1964). Defendant in a non-jury
case was convicted of statutory rape and assaults
on female children. On appeal, defendant contended that he introduced sufficient evidence to
rebut the presumption of sanity, and that the
State did not meet its ensuing burden of proving

sanity beyond a reasonable doubt. Noting that the
case was one of first impression, the Court of
Appeals of Maryland remanded, without iaffirming
or reversing, for such further proceedings as may
be necessary to comply with the requirements of
its opinion. The Court held that defendant's
expert witnesses succeeded in overcoming the presumption of sanity; that because criminal responsibility (legal sanity) once in issue is an essential
element of a crime, inasmuch as sanity is requisite
to criminal intent, the State must bear the burden
or prqving sanity beyond a reasonable doubt, as
it must do in proving all other elements of the
crime; and since the record failed to disclose
whether this test was used by the trial court in determining that defendant was sane, the cause would
be remanded to the trial court to indicate which
test was applied. The alternative test, discussed
and rejected, was the "preponderance of the
evidence" test, which treats the presumption of
insanity as one of fact rather than of law, and
under which the defendant must show his insanity
by a preponderance of all the evidence, including
the presumption of sanity. The test adopted, in
contrast, was characterized by the Court as involving the presumption of sanity as "a legal
presumption which prevails only until sufficient
proof of insanity has been introduced [to rebut
the presumption], in which event the burden of
proof shifts to the State to prove its case against
the defendant beyond a reasonable doubt." The
Court noted that "difficult problems relating to
the protection of society and of a defendant who
is acquitted on the ground of insanity" have been
met by recent legislation [MD. CODE art. 59, §5(b)
(1963)] providing for discretionary civil commitment of persons found not guilty by reason of
insanity. Two judges dissented.
Insanity-Burden of Proof-Slate v. Waugh,
127 N.W.2d 429 (S.D. 1964). Defendant was
convicted of first degree manslaughter. On appeal,
defendant contended that the trial court erroneously placed upon her the burden of proving insanity. The Supreme Court of South Dakota reversed and granted a new trial, holding that where
defendant had introduced lay and expert testimony
of her insanity and thus placed her sanity in issue,
the State had the burden of proving her sanity
beyond a reasonable doubt; that the court's instructions, which in effect placed on defendant the
burden of proving insanity, constituted prejudicial
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error; and that although other instructions properly stated that if the jury should entertain a
reasonable doubt as to defendant's sanity they
should acquit, these did not cure the affirmative
misdirection previously given.
Insanity at Time of Trial-Rowe v. State, 199
A.2d 785 (Md. 1964). Defendant was convicted of
second degree murder. On appeal, defendant contended that the trial court should not have received the jury's verdict on the issue of defendant's
guilt or innocence, when by special verdict the
jury had determined that he was insane at the
time of trial. The Court of Appeals of Maryland
ordered that the findings on the issues of sanity
should remain as entered and that the verdict of
guilty as well as the judgment and sentence be
stricken and remanded for entry of an order staying the proceedings and committing defendant to
a mental institution until he should recover his
reason. The Court held that where the jury returned special verdicts that defendant was sane
at the time the alleged crime was committed but
insane at the time of trial, the trial court should
not have received the jury's verdict on the question of defendant's guilt or innocence and had no
authority to ignore the jury's finding of insanity
at time of trial and to sentence defendant. The
Court noted that while some authorities drav a
distinction between the test for determining insanity then (at time of crime) and the test for
ascertaining insanity now (at time of trial), the
M'Naghten test alone applied in Maryland to
determine insanity both then and now and would be
applied until such time as the Legislature should
change the test. Three Judges dissented, recommending the enactment of certain remedial
statutory provisions.
Juries-Jacksoni v. Denno, 84 Sup. Ct. 1774
(1964). See Confessions,, supra.
Multiple Punishment-Balkcom v, Defore, 135
S.E.2d 425 (Ga. 1964). Petitioner pleaded guilty
to a five-count indictment charging him with
abandoning his five children, and five consecutive
sentences of one year each were imposed. The city
court granted petitioner's application for writ of
habeas corpus, after petitioner had served one of
the sentences. On writ of error by the warden,
petitioner contended that he committed but one
offense, punishable by a single sentence, for the
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single abandonment, even though there were five
children in his family. The Supreme Court of
Georgia affirmed, holding that- since criminal
statutes must be construed strictly against the
state, a given act of abandonment in violation of
GA. CODE A.'N. §74-9902 was but one offense,
regardless of the number of children in one's
family; consequently, the trial court had no jurisdiction to inflict punishment greater than the first
sentence, and the city court properly released
petitioner on habeas corpus. The Court noted that
a single act-e.g., firing a shot toward a group of
people, or reckless driving, resulting in several
deaths-may constitute more than one criminal
offense, but distinguished such cases from the
instant case on the ground that where one act
constitutes several offenses the accused individual
owed a separate duty to each member of society
whose interest was infringed, whereas in the instant case defendant's duty of support was owed
to his family collectively.
Obscenity-City of Newark v. Licht, 200 A.2d
508 (N.J. Super. Ct., App. Div. 1964). Defendant
was convicted in the Newark Municipal Court of
violating an obscenity ordinance, and the Essex
County Court affirmed on appeal and trial de novo.
On appeal, defendant contended that the material
in question, which he was convicted of having imported, was not obscene. The Appellate Division
of the New Jersey Superior Court reversed, holding that where after defendant's conviction the
County Sheriff turned over the exhibits used
against defendant at the trial-37 photographs of
male nudes-to the United States Postal authorities, who had apparently lost all of them, the
validity of defendant's conviction would have to be
determined on the basis of an exact duplicate of a
single one of the photographs which had since been
discovered, inasmuch as "there can be no substitute
for appellate appraisal of the identical material
impugned where the charge is obscenity"; that the'
frame of reference in determining obscenity was
the average member of society, not the average
homosexual male, so that the effect upon male
homosexuals was not determinative in applying
the "prurient appeal" aspect of the obscenity test
[citing State v. Hudson County News Co., 196 A.2d
225 (N1.J. 1963), abstracted at 55 J. Cpns. L., C.
& P.S. 255 (1964)]; and that the one photograph
before the Court on appeal-portraying a front
view of a nude adolescent boy with his genitalia
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no more accentuated than any other part of his
body-was not obscene, because it did not appeal
to the prurient interest of an average member of
society and was not patently offensive.
Obscenity-I the Matter of Trans-Lux Distributing Corp. v. Board of Regents, 198 N.E.2d
242 (N.Y. 1964). The Board of Regents, in application of N.Y. EDuc. LAW ch. 16, §122, directed
the elimination of two scenes from a motion picture
("A Stranger Knocks") as a condition for granting
a license for exhibition of the film. On appeal from
the Appellate Division's annullment of the Board's
determination, respondent film distributor contended that due process of law as embodying the
first amendment prohibited the State from ordering
the scenes deleted as a condition to lawful exhibition, inasmuch as the scenes in question were
necessary to the artistic whole of the motion picture, and the dominant theme of the movie was
not obscene. The New York Court of Appeals
reversed and reinstated the Board of Regents'
determination, with costs, in separate opinions
by Judges Burke, Desmond, Scileppi, and Williams
[sitting by appointment] in which each of the
other three concurred. The majority [as seen in
the substantially similar opinions] held that there
is a traditional distinction, for purposes of determining whether an expression is entitled to first
amendment protection, between expression which
merely advocates ideas and expression which constitutes conduct, and that the latter may be subjected to valid restriction even though presented
with a view toward expression; that a filmed
presentation of real or simulated sexual intercourse
"is just as subject to State prohibition as similar
conduct if engaged in on the street"; that the two
scenes ordered deleted by the Board of Regents,
which "'forthrightly depict the fulfillment of
sexual intercourse,'" constituted an offensive
display of conduct which could constitutionally
be prohibited even though acted-out sexual intercourse was the vehicle for the movie-maker's art;
and since the material in question [the two scenes]
was "conduct," as opposed to "speech," it need
not come within that part of the Roth test requiring that obscenity must be the dominant
theme of the work taken as a whole in order that
the work be constitutionally subject to state regulation. Three Judges dissented without opinion,
voting to affirm on the basis of the Appellate
Division's memorandum opinion.

[Regarding the point that the "dominant theme"
aspect of Roth did not apply-decisive in that the
motion picture apparently would not hbve been
"obscene" under the 'complete Roth test-the
majority's holding appears to be unique. Compare
Jacobellis v. Ohio, 84 Sup. Ct. 1676 (1964), abstracted supra, where a movie containing similar
scenes was held constitutionally protected.]
Police Power-State v. Griswold, 200 A.2d 479
(Conn. 1964). Defendants, acting director and
medical director of a planned parenthood center
which provided birth control information, instruction, medical advice, and contraceptive materials to married persons, were convicted of aiding
and abetting the violation of CoNN. GEN. STAT.
§53-32, which prohibits the use of contraceptives.
On appeal, the Appellate Division of the Connecticut Circuit Court sustained the convictions
and certified questions of law to the Supreme
Court of Errors of Connecticut. Defendants
conceded that recent Court of Errors decisions
upheld the constitutionality of the statute, but
urged the Court to modify its prior opinions to
better serve justice in the light of "current developments in medical, social and religious thought in
this area, and the present conditions of American
and Connecticut life." Adhering to "the principle
that courts may not interfere with the exercise by
a state of the police power to conserve the public
safety, and welfare, including health and morals,
if the law has a real and substantial relation to the
accomplishment of those objects," the Supreme
Court of Errors of Connecticut found no error,
holding that defendants' convictions were not an
invasion of their constitutional rights, inasmuch
as the police power statute under attack was not
an arbitrary or unreasonable attempt to exercise
the state's authority in the public interest.
Police Power-Rogers v. State, 199 A.2d 895
(Del. 1964). Defendant was convicted of barbering
on Sunday in violation of DEL. CODE tit. 24, §15.
On appeal, defendant contended that the statute
violates the due process and equal protection
clauses of the fourteenth amendment. The Supreme Court of Delaware reversed and remanded
with instructions to set aside the verdict and
sentence and to dismiss the indictment, holding
that where there was no general Sunday closing
law, the statute singling out barbers-and excluding beauticians-could not be justified as
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effectuating any legitimate state interest, and thus
violates the fourteenth amendment because it
constitutes an unjust and unreasonable attempt
to discriminate against barbers and an arbitrary
interference with private business. Placing special
emphasis on the fact that beauty shops were not
covered by the statute, the court stated; "Looking
at reaiities, we are convinced that the true purpose
of this statutory provision was not to attain
greater cleanliness in barbershops or to protect the
health of barbers .... [Tihe provision was designed not to serve the public but to serve the
interest of a part of the trade by restricting competition and arbitrarily imposing the wishes and
desires of some members of that trade upon
others."
Police Power-City of New Orleans v. Kiefer,
164 So. 2d 336 (La. 1964). Two female defendants
were convicted of violating an ordinance commanding that "no female entertainer or performer
or employee in an establishment wherein a striptease or burlesque act is conducted or engaged in
shall mingle therein with any patron or spectator
for any purpose," and defendant Kiefer was convicted of violating a similar ordinance making it
unlawful for an owner and/or manager of such
establishment to permit such mingling. On appeal,
the Criminal District Court annulled the 'onvictions and discharged defendants on the ground
that the ordinances in question were unconstitutional. On appeal by the City, defendants
contended that the words "striptease," "burlesque," and "mingling" were so vague and indefinite that defendants' rights under LA. CoNsT.
art. I, §10, to be informed of the nature and cause
of the accusations against them, were violated.
The Supreme Court of Louisiana reversed and
reinstated the convictions and sentences, holding
that the determinative principle was that, although
a criminal offense must be precisely described so
that persons of ordinary intelligence will know
when they are violating the law, words of a general
nature describing numerous acts, when read in
context with legislative purpose, do not necessarily
lack this constitutionally required precision; and
in light of this principle, the ordinances in question
were not unconstitutional for vagueness, inasmuch
as each of the words under attack has a clear
connotation to the ordinary mind. The Court also
rejected defendants' contention that the ordinances' prohibition of mingling impaired first
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amendment rights, since the regulation constituted
a reasonable police regulation of such establishments.
Prejudice by Indirection-Nichols v. State, 378
S.W.2d 335 (Tex. Ct. Crim. App. 1964); State v.
Parsans,200 A.2d 340 (N.J. Super. Ct., App. Div.
1964). See Scientific Evidence-Lie Detector
Evidence, infra.
Prejudicial Publicity-Hanley v. State, 391
P.2d 865 (Nev. 1964). Defendant was charged
with burglary, and his pre-trial motion for change
of venue was denied without prejudice by the
trial court. On direct appeal from the order of
denial [see NEv. REv. STAT. §2.1101, defendant
contended that he could not receive a fair and
impartial trial in Clark County because of five
newspaper articles which implied that he was
guilty of the charge and had attempted to illegally
influence jurors at a prior scheduling of the case.
The Supreme Court of Nevada affirmed, holding
that defendant's motion for change of venue was
premature, inasmuch as the question "whether
adverse publicity may fatally infect the fairness of
a criminal trial is an issue to be presented to the
trial court by appropriate motion after voir dire
examination of the jurors. Until that stage in the
proceeding, a court is not in a position to determine
whether there exists a substantial nexus between
the adverse publicity and the ability to impanel a
fair and impartial jury." The Court noted that,
while the voir dire should be before the trial court
when a motion for change of venue must be decided, the voir dire examination is not the sole
criterion.
Right to Counsel-State v. Anderson, 392 P.2d
784 (Ariz. 1964). Defendant, upon his plea of
guilty, was convicted of the misdemeanor of attempting to assist the escape of an incarcerated
prisoner. On appeal, defendant contended that he.
was deprived of his federal constitutional right to
counsel. After examining the historical background
leading to the decision of Gideon v. Wainwright,
372 U.S. 335, abstracted at 54 J. CRam. L., C. &
P.S. 193 (1963), and language of that case itself,
the Supreme Court of Arizona reversed and remanded, holding that since the potential penalty
for the crime with which defendant was charged
was a $1,000 fine and two years imprisonment, the
crime, though technicai-, a misdemeanor, was a
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"serious crime" as to which Gideon required that a
state provide representation by counsel for an
indigent defendant; and that since defendant was
an indigent, did not waive counsel, and pleaded
guilty because he lacked counsel, defendant's
right to counsel was denied by the trial court.
The Court also held that since under Arizona law
the accused must make his plea at arraignment,
the constitutional guarantee of right to counsel
must be satisfied no later than at the arraignment
stage. The Court noted that in the future the
trial court must determine whether or not a misdemeanor charged is a "serious offense" requiring
counsel, and that the nature of the offense, the
potential penalty, and the complexity of the case
were factors to be considered -in making the determination.
Right to Counsel-People v. Douglas, 38 Cal.
Rptr. 884 (1964). After reversal of their convictions by the United States Supreme Court,
defendants Douglas and Meyes were retried and
convicted of robbery, assault with intent to murder,
and assault with a deadly weapon; defendant
Meyes was sentenced as an habitual criminal.
[The United States Supreme Court had reversed
defendants' convictions because of denial of counsel
on appeal, Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353,
noted in abstract of Gideon v. Wainwright, 54
J. CRix. L., C. & P.S. 193 (1963).] On appeal from
the judgments of conviction and from the tial
court's denials of their motions for new trial,
defendants contended that they had been deprived of their respective rights to counsel at the
trial. The Supreme Court of California reversed,
holding that where defendants dismissed a single
court-appointed' counsel and proceeded to trial
without counsel after the trial court refused to
appoint separate counsel upon the appointed
counsel's request for cause, defendants did not
waive their requests for or rights to separate
counsel, since after the court's ruling forced defendants to choose between joint counsel and no
counsel at all, their dismissal of joint counsel did
not amount to a waiver of independent counsel;
and that the appointed counsel's motion for appointment of separate counsel, made on the
ground that in his opinion there was a conflict of
interest, should have been granted, since the facts
that defendant Meyes had been convicted of
murder in a related case in a joint trial at which
Douglas was acquitted, and that Meyes but not

Douglas had a felony record, indicated that the
different backgrounds of defendants made it reasonably probable that the interests of each would
require the pursuit of a different course of action.
Right to Counsel-Hodge v. Reincke, 200 A.2d
252 (Conn. Super. Ct. 1964). Petitioner was convicted of a narcotics offense and sentenced as a
second offender. On petition for writ of habeas
corpus, petitioner contended that he was denied
the right to counsel to appeal his conviction. The
Superior Court of Connecticut discharged petitioner from custody unless within a reasonable time
appellate counsel be appointed and time to appeal
to the Supreme Court of Errors of Connecticut be
extended, holding that where under Connecticut
law petitioner's first and only appeal as of right
was to the Supreme Court of Errors, and petitioner
because of indigency was unable to be heard on
such appeal when the public defender was of the
opinion that there was no appealable question
and the State refused to appoint other counsel for
appellate purposes, denial to petitioner of counsel
to perfect his first and only appeal as of right was
violative of the equal protection clause of the
fourteenth amendment, inasmuch as a defendant
with paid counsel may require the Supreme Court
of Errors to hear his appeal, and petitioner as an
indigent was entitled to no less.
Compare Speers v. Gladden, 390 P.2d 635 (Ore.
1964), abstracted infra, which reaches a contrary
result bn very similar facts.
Right to Counsel-French v. State, 161 So. 2d
879 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1964). Petitioner was
convicted of breaking and entering with intent
to commit a felony and of grand larceny. On appeal
from the Criminal Court's denial of his motion for
post-conviction relief, petitioner contended that
the trial court's refusal to grant a continuance on
motion of his court-appointed counsel amounted
to a denial of effective assistance of counsel. The
Florida District Court of Appeal reversed and
remanded, holding that if, as petitioner contended,
the trial court appointed counsel for petitioner on
the day of trial and then denied counsel's motion
for continuance requested in order to be allowed a
reasonable time to confer with petitioner and
prepare for trial, such action was tantamount to
deprivation of counsel as guaranteed to petitioner
by the sixth amendment and implemented by the
Gideon case; and consequently, the judgment
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denying petitioner's motion for post-conviction
relief would be reversed and the cause remanded
to the lower court [presumably for determination
of the truth of petitioner's allegations]. The Court
noted that although the trial judge observed the
letter of the law in appointing counsel for petitioner, the alleged denial of continuance did not
follow the spirit and intent of the law.
Right to Counsel-Commonwealth v. O'Leary,
198 N.E.2d 403 (Mass. 1964). Defendant filed
pleas in abatement to two misdemeanor and one
felony indictment on offenses relating to driving,
contending that counsel was not provided for him
at the probable cause hearing. The Superior Court
reported the question whether the pleas in abatement should be sustained. The Supreme Judicial
Court of Massachusetts ordered that the pleas be
overruled, holding that where there was no suggestion that counsel would have done anything
defendant did not do or would have refrained from
doing anything defendant did do at the probable
cause hearing, and where nothing was waived,
defendant did not plead guilty, and, in short, no
right of the slightest value of defendant's had
been lost, the probable cause hearing and subsequent proceedings based thereon would not be
invalidated merely because defendant was not
represented by counsel at the probable cause
hearing. While stating, "We find nothing in the
cases upon which defendant relies requiring any
such result [of invalidation]," the Court nonetheless
suggested that, "in view of the possible implication
in those decisions [citing Gideon v. Wainwright
and others] and of others to follow," each district
court judge should appoint counsel for an indigent
defendant in every probable cause hearing unless
counsel were waived, and appointment of counsel
should be offered at trial "except for the most
trifling offenses for which no sentence of imprisonment may be imposed."
Right to Counsel-State v. Hayes, 135 S.E.2d
653 (N.C. 1964). Petitioner was convicted for an
act of crime against nature, allegedly committed
while incarcerated for another offense, and was
sentenced to 18 years imprisonment. On appeal
from the Superior Court's denial of his petition for
post-conviction relief, petitioner contended that
his right to counsel was denied at trial in that he
was represented by counsel assigned by the prosecuting attorney. Noting that neither petitioner's
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counsel's good faith nor that of the prosecutor was
questioned and that defendant would probably
have fared no better had he been. represented by
an attorney of his own choosing, the Supreme
Court of North Carolina vacated and remanded
to the Superior Court with directions that petitioner be discharged if not retried within a reasonable time. The Court held that a person charged
with a criminal offense is entitled to waive representation by counsel or to be represented by counsel
selected and employed by him or, if he is indigent,
assigned to him by the judge, but that assignment
of counsel by the prosecuting attorney is not permissible; and hence, defendant was denied his
right to counsel and the judgment attacked must
be vacated.
Right to Counsel-Speers v. Gladden, 390 P.2d
635 (Ore. 1964). Petitioner was convicted of
burglary. After the Supreme Court of Oregon
affirmed the burglary conviction, petitioner was
proceeded against as an habitual offender and
sentenced to life imprisonment. At petitioner's
request for appointment of counsel for purposes of
appealing from the habitual criminal judgment,
the trial court appointed the attorney who had
represented him on trial of the burglary charge.
After filing a notice of appeal, the attorney, one
Cummins, requested permission to withdraw for
lack of prejudicial error of record in the habitual
criminal proceeding. The trial court granted
Cummins' motion, notified petitioner that no
other counsel for prosecution of appeal would be
appointed, and dismissed petitioner's appeal for
want of prosecution. Thereafter, petitioner's
application for post-conviction relief was dismissed
with prejudice by the Circuit Court. On appeal,
petitioner [apparently] contended that the State
was under a constitutional obligation to furnish
him with a second appellate counsel after Cummins withdrew from the case. The Supreme Court
of Oregon affirmed, holding that since the canons
of professional ethics require an attorney concluding that an appeal would be frivolous to
withdraw, the State was not required to appoint a
second counsel at public expense, especially in
light of Cummins' experience and capability, and
considering Oregon procedure allowing an indigent
defendant in petitioner's position the right to
appeal pro se and to receive a free transcript.
The Court distinguished the instant case from
Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353, abstracted at
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54 J. CRau. L., C. & P.S. 193 (1963), noting that
in Douglas "the petitioner did not have the benefit of his own counsel's appraisal of the record for
the purpose of determining whether error had
been committed." The Court concluded, "It is not
reasonable to construe the Douglas case to mean
that an indigent defendant is entitled to a parade
of counsel until he finds one who is willing to
present the appeal regardless of its merits."
Compare Hodge v. Reincke, 200 A.2d 252 (Conn.
Super. Ct. 1964), abstracted supra, which reaches
a contrary result on very similar facts.
Right to Counsel-Whitley v. Cunningham,
135 S.E.2d 823 (Va. 1964). Petitioner was convicted of robbery and larceny. On appeal from the
Court of Hustings' denial of his petition for writ
of habeas corpus, petitioner contended that his
court-appointed counsel's assistance wts so ineffective as to amount to a denial of his right to
counsel. The Supreme Court of Appeals of Virginia reversed the order, set aside the convictions,
and remanded them to the Hustings Court with
directions to enter the writ, and it ordered that
petitioner be tried on the indictments, holding
that where petitioner's court-appointed counsel
spent an hour at most in preparation for trial on
10 to 12 indictments involving 19 or more charges
of complex offenses, petitioner was deprived of the
effective assistance of counsel. The Court noted
that petitioner had made certain confessions which
the attorney had not examined so as to be assured
that the confessions to a given offense were to acts
amounting in law to that offense. lit should be
noted that the trial court did not rush petitioner
to trial; the court in fact inquired of petitioner's
counsel whether he would like a continuance.]
Right to Counsel-State ex rel. Barth v. Burke,
128 N.W.2d 422 (Wis. 1964). Petitioner was convicted on his plea of guilty on 19 misdemeanor
counts for issuing worthless checks. On original
petition for writ of habeas corpus, petitioner contended that the trial court deprived him of his
right to counsel. The Supreme Court of Wisconsin
vacated and set aside the judgment and sentence
and ordered a new trial, holding that although
petitioner was charged with misdemeanors, the
possible sentence was substantial, so petitioner
had a right to counsel at the trial; that the trial
court's finding that petitioner was not indigent
was made upon an inadequate determination of the

facts and thus was error; and since the record
failed to show petitioner was informed that, if
indigent, he would be entitled to havd counsel
appointed for him, petitioner did not freely and
intelligently waive his constitutional right to
counsel.
Right to a Fair Trial-Oler v. State, 378 S.W.2d
857 (Tex. Ct: Crim. App. 1964). Defendant was
convicted of possession of morphine and was
sentenced to life imprisonment as a third felony
offender. On appeal, defendant contended that he
was denied due process when the State was permitted to read to the jury the indictment containing the recitation of the two prior convictions
and to prove them before the jury heard evidence
on and determined defendant's guilt of theprimary
offense, citing Lane v. Warden, 320 F.2d 179
(4th Cir. 1963), abstracted at 55 3. Cnnm. L.,
C. & P.S. 126 (1964). The Texas Court of Criminal
Appeals affirmed, holding that "This Court has
not been granted rule making powers, and we have
concluded that the radical changes in long established common law and statutory procedures
which would be required, were appellant's contention to be sustained, must therefore come from
the Legislature and not this Court. While we
agree that there is much merit in appellants
contention, and undoubtedly the trend is in that
direction, we must exercise judicial restraint and
await the action of the legislative branch of our
government."
Right To Telephcne-Commonweatth v. Bouchard,
198 N.E.2d 411 (Mass. 1964). Defendant was
convicted of drunken driving and on appeal and
trial de novo was found guilty by the jury in the
Superior Court. On exceptions, defendant contended that the trial court erred in denying his
motion for a directed verdict and refusing to give
his proffered instruction that "If a person is not
informed of his right to use the telephone forthwith upon his arrival at a station house or other
place of detention before he is booked, then he is*
entitled to a verdict of 'Not Guilty.'" The Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts overruled
defendant's exccptions, holding that even if MAss.
GEN. LAws ch. 276, §33A (1963) (requiring that
an arrested person must be informed of his right
to use the telephone forthwith upon arrival at the
station) were violated, defendant suffered no harm
therefrom, and consequently there was no error.
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The Court construed "forthwith" to mean "as
soon as reasonably practicable," and noted that
within this definition booking could lawfully
precede informing the arrestee of the right to use
the telephone. In dictum the Court indicated that
if harm-in the form of admissions, confessions,
or leads to the discovery of incriminating evidence,
obtained during a period when §33A was being
violated-resulted from violation of the section,
exclusion of this evidence would be a reasonable
sanction.
Scientific Evidence-Lie Detector EvidenceNichols v. State, 378 S.W.2d 335 (Tex. Ct. Crim.
App. 1964); State v. Parsons, 200 A.2d 340 (N.J.
Super. Ct., App. Div. 1964). Appellate courts in
two states have recently ruled on the question
whether admission of evidence that a prosecution
witness-as opposed to the defendant-has taken
a polygraph test constitutes reversible error.
In Nichols v. State, the Texas Court of Criminal
Appeals reversed and remanded defendant's
statutory rape conviction on the ground that the
prosecutrix' affirmative answer to the district
attorney's question whether she had taken a lie
detector test, without her stating the results
thereof, was so prejudicial that the trial court's
instruction that the jury completely disregard the
matter could not cure the harmful effect; nd
hence, the trial court's failure to grant defendant's
motion for mistrial constituted reversible error,
even though cautionary instructions were given.
The Court reasoned that the results of polygraph
tests are inadmissible for lack of scientific standing and recognition, and evidence that a prosecuting witness had taken a lie detector test was
tantamount to the prohibited disclosure of the
test results, since the jury would infer from the
fact that the district attorney was using her as a
witness that the polygraph showed she was telling
the truth. The Court stated, "The practical effect
of the testimony was to allow by inference, the
admissioh of damaging evidence that would not
have been legally admissible had it been submitted directly."
While the Nichols case probably represents a
fairly common situation-introduction of evidence
that a prosecution witness took a lie detector
test, with the jury inferring that its results showed
the witness told the truth-, the Parsons case is
factually unique in that it involves a situation
where the inference drawn from evidence that a
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prosecution witness, as opposed to a defendant,
took a lie detector test was that the witness was
lying. One Wilds, an accomplice-of defendant
Parsons. had originally given the police statements
exculpating defendant, but later changed his story
to involve defendant. In an effort to fortify Wilds'
credibility against an anticipated defense attack on
the basis of the prior inconsistent statements, the
State on direct examination of Wilds elicited information that he had attempted to protect
defendant until confronted with the results of his
(Wilds') lie detector test, and that the polygraph
examiner stated in his presence that the test
showed Wilds lied about not having been with defendant. The trial court instructed the jury to
disregard the testimony concerning the results of
the test. The Appellate Division of the New Jersey
Superior Court reversed and remanded defendant's convictions for breaking and entering and
larceny, holding that results of polygraph tests and
allusions to a defendant's refusal to submit to such
a test were inadmissible [citing State v. Driver,
183 A.2d 655 (N.J. 1962), abstracted at 54 J.
Cnrm. L., C. & P.S. 579 (1963)]; that the evidence
complained of in effect informed the jury that
Wilds' lie detector test showed that defendant
participated with Wilds in committing the crimes
charged; and that it was irrelevant that the damaging evidence was elicited via disclosure of a lie
detector test taken by a prosecution witness rather
than by defendant, where it was apparent that
when the witness took the test, he knew whether
or not defendant was guilty. The Court stated,
"Nor does it matter that the disclosure is by indirection rather than directly." The Court noted
that admission of the evidence that Wilds changed
his story after being informed of the results of his
lie detector test constituted plain error requiring
reversal, even if defendant's objection was not
properly preserved. In the opinion, the Court
discussed the inferences drawn from polygraph
evidence from the standpoint of the subject's.
and the jury's subjective belief in the reliability
of such tests.
Search and Seizure-Emergency Situation-United States v. Barone, 330 F.2d 543 (2d Cir.
1964). Defendant was convicted of possessing
counterfeit money with intent to defraud. On
appeal, defendant contended that the District
Court erred in refusing to grant his motion to
suppress illegally obtained evidence. The Court of
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Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed, holding
that the right of police to enter and investigate
in an emergency situation without the accompanying intent to search or arrest is inherent in the
very nature of their duty as police officers; that
where three New York police officers knocked on
the door of room 9 7 of a rooming house, because
they heard persistent screams emanating from the
house which they determined were coming from
room S 7, announced in answer to a male voice's
question that they were police, and finally were
admitted by a woman, the officers were lawfully
on the premises, because it was their duty to
investigate the source of the loud screams they
heard in the dead of night; that Patrolman Cottle
lawfully entered the bathroom, -inasmuch as having
found nothing amiss in the main room, it was the
officers' duty to complete their view of the
premises, and this lawfulness was not affected by
the fact that defendant left the bathroom just as
they were about to enter; that Cottle's observance
of tom currency floating in plain view did not
constitute a search,'and "as it is unusual for anyone
to flush away good paper money, it was in the line
of the officer's duty to take the money from the
toilet to ascertain its nature"; and if Cottle's
pulling of the chain of the water closet to recover
further pieces of money constituted a search, it
was justified by discovery of the first pieces, which
made it apparent that evidence of a crime would
be destroyed unless immediate measures were
taken.
Search and Seizure-State v. Rowan, 163 So.
2d 87 (La. 1964). Defendant was convicted of
burglary. On appeal, defendant contended that
evidence seized without authority from his car in
violation of his fourth amendment rights was used
against him at the trial. The Supreme Court of
Louisiana affirmed, holding that where defendant
had been arrested in Hattiesburg, Mississippi
(the validity of this arrest is not contested) and
stated that he had a Studebaker automobile, and
later that day a Hattiesburg police officer found
an out-of-state Studebaker with unlocked doors
and with the keys in the ignition parked at an
expired parking metcr in a then deserted business
district, the officer's taking the car to the station
for complete inspection, after his search of the
glove compartment revealed nothing as to the
identity of the car's owner, was reasonable under
the circumstances; and consequently, the evidence

obtained as a result of such inspection was not
the fruit of an unlawful search.
Search and Seizure-Santos v. State, 379 S.W.2d
667 (Tex. Ct. Crim. App. 1964). Defendant was
convicted of possession of marihuana. On appeal,
defendant contended that the search warrant
under which the evidence against her was seized
was invalid because it incorporated by reference
an affidavit which had been altered. The Texas
Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed, holding that
where, the affidavit incorporated by reference in
the warrant described the premises to be searched
as Apartment 6 at a certain address, but before
executing the warrant the affiant officers discovered
that this description was a typographical error
and returned to the issuing magistrate, who corrected the affidavit to correctly read "Apartment
2" and initialed the the change, the warrant was
valid and the search pursuant to its execution was
lawful.
Search and Seizure--Emergency SituationState v. Hoyt, 128 N.W.2d 645 (Wis. 1964). See
Homicide--Manslaughter, supra.
Search and Seizure-Standing To ObjectMachin v. State, 162 So. 2d 547 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
1964). Defendant was convicted of assault with
intent to commit robbery. On appeal, defendant
contended that the trial court erroneously denied
his motion to suppress, since the evidence in
question had been illegally seized from a car which
he was driving. Not reaching the question of the
legality of the search, the Florida District Court of
Appeal affirmed, holding that since the car defendant was driving belonged to his cousin, and
there was "nothing in the record to indicate that
the defendant was anything other than a mere
invitee," defendant "had no right to question
the admission into evidence" of the items complained of.
Self-Incrimination-People v.Kramer, 38 Cal.
Rptr. 487 (Dist. Ct. App. 1964). Defendant was
convicted of forgery. On appeal, defendant contended that the trial court had a duty to advise
him of his right not to testify in his defense. Noting
that the question was one of first impression in
California, the District Court of Appeal reversed,
holding that where defendant, who was not represented by counsel at the trial, exhibited an almost
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total lack of any knowledge of evidentiary rules or
criminal judicial procedures, he did not waive his
privilege against self-incrimination when he took
the stand, even though the trial court had advised
him of various procedural alternatives, including
that "you may, if you desire, .. . take the stand
yourself," inasmuch as the record did not show
that defendant was specifically informed that he
had a privilege to refrain from testifying, and a
person cannot waive a right he does not know he
has. The Court distinguished the instant case from
cases involving defendants represented by counsel
at trial, where it is held that defendant's taking
the stand does constitute a waiver of the privilege.
Sentencing-United States v. Fleish, 227 F.
Supp. 967 (E.D. Mich. 1964). See Self-Incrimination, supra.
Sentencing-People v. Mitchell, 38 Cal. Rptr.
726 (1964). See Homicide-Felony Murder,
supra.
Sentencing-Kuk v. State, 392 P.2d 630 (Nev.
1964). See Insanity, supra.
Sentencing-State v. Maxey, 198 A.2d 768
(N.J. 1964). Defendant was sentenced to two
consecutive life sentences for murder. On apneal
from the County Court's denial of his motion for
correction of sentence, defendant contended that
the court was without power to impose successive
life sentences. The Supreme Court of New Jersey
affirmed, holding that since a "life sentence" does
not mean that a man must be imprisoned for life,
in view of parole provisions, the practical result of
which is that a single life sentence is an indeterminate sentence with a possible minimum of about
14 years and a maximum of life, it was not legally
impossible to serve consecutive life sentences, and
the judgment under attack would be affirmed.
Sentencing-State v. White, 136 S.E.2d 205
(N.C. 1964). In 1961, defendant was convicted of
robbery by the use and threatened use of dangerous
weapons and was sentenced to 10 years imprisonment. On petition for post-conviction relief, the
Criminal Sessions Court vacated the judgment
and ordered a new trial on the ground that defendant had been denied his right to counsel. Upon
retrial in 1963, defendant was again convicted and
was sentenced to a term of 12 to 15 years. On
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appeal, defendant contended that his right to due
process of law was violated when the trial court
imposed upon him at retrial a sentence greater
than that imposed originally for the identical
offense, since this impaired his right of review of
the constitutionality of his trial, and that the trial
court's refusal to credit his second sentence with
the time served under the first sentence violated
his fourteenth amendment rights. The Supreme
Court of North Carolina affirmed, holding that
where defendant at his request obtained a new
trial, hoping to be set free or obtain a lighter sentence, he accepted the hazard of receiving a heavier
sentence, and this eventuality did not deny him
any constitutional right; and that in the absence
of a statute to the contrary, defendant was not
entitled to credit for time served on the first sentence, inasmuch as in seeking a new trial, defendant
must be deemed to have consented to wiping out
all the consequences of the first trial.
Sex Offenses-State v.Griswold, 200 A.2d 479
(Conn. 1964). See Police Power, supra.
Sex Offenses-State v. Bonanno, 163 So. 2d 72
(La. 1964). See Statutory Construction-Crime
Against Nature, supra.
Sex Offenses-State v.Vines, 162 So. 2d 332
(La. 1964). Defendant was convicted of obscenity
as defined by LA. REv. STAT. §14:106(4), for
having performed a lewd, lascivious, sexually indecent dance in the presence of another "with the
intent of arousing sexual desire." On appeal, defendant contended that since there was no evidence
that anyone present at defendant's "striptease"
dance was sexually aroused or stimulated, the evidence was insufficient to support her conviction.
The Supreme Court of Louisiana affirmed, holding
that since all the statute requires .isthat the
performance be made with the intent of arousing
sexual desire, lack of evidence that anyone's sexual
desire was actually aroused was immaterial; and
since the evidence justified a finding that the
requisite intent was present, defendant's conviction must be affirmed.
[It should be noted that the pertinent section,
which provides, "Obscenity is the intentional...
performance by any person or persons in the presence of another person or persons with the intent
of arousing sexual desire, of any lewd, lascivious,
sexually indecent dancing, lewd, lascivious, or
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sexually indecent posing, lewd, lascivious or sexually indecent body movement," makes criminal the
conduct of one spouse seeking to seduce the other
.in private.]
Sex Offenses-Crroboration-Bouton v. State,
377 S.W.2d 936 (Tenn. 1964); State v. Carcia, 199
A.2d 860 (N.J. Super. Ct., App. Div. 1964). See
Admissions by Silence, supra.

England, which disclosed several cases sustaining
convictions for burglary involving a church, and
no authority denied that the rule existed at common law; and since the trial court's reference to
the church as the "dwelling-house of Almighty
God" was directed toward the historical origin of
the rule that the breaking and entering of a church
in the nighttime constitutes burglary, this reference
violated none of defendants' constitutional rights.

Statutory
Construction-Assault--State
%v. Statutory Construction-Child AbandonmentFerguson, 135 S.E.2d 626 (N.C. 1964). See Assault Balkcom v. Defore,
135 S.E.2d 425 (Ga. 1964): See
-Intent To Kill, supra.
Multiple Punishment, supra.
Statutory Construction-Breaking and Entering-Cappetta v. State, 162 So: 2d 309 (Fla. Dist.
Ct. App. 1964). Defendant was convicted on two
counts of breaking and entering with intent to
commit grand larceny, and possession of burglary
tools. On appeal, defendant contended, inter alia,
that there was no proof of the essential element of
a "breaking" with regard to one of the breaking
and entering counts. The Florida District Court of
Appeal affirmed as to one breaking and entering
count and as to the possession count, but reversed
as to the conviction involving the contested breaking, holding that where defendant was found
inside a house not shown to have been closed and
no physical act on' his part was proved, there was
no evidence on that count of a breaking, an essential element of the crime charged.
Statutory Construction-Burglary-McGraw v.
State, 199 A.2d 229 (Md. 1964). Defendant was
convicted of burglary of the Christ Congregational
Church. On appeal, defendant contended that in
absence of a statute defining burglary, the common
law crime of burglary was charged, and since there
was no common law crime of burglary of a church,
a fatal variance existed; and that the trial court's
reference, in its charge to the jury, to a church as
the "dwelling-house of Almighty God" contravened his fourteenth amendment rights. The Court
of Appeals of Maryland affirmed, holding that
- since the statute [MD. CODE art. 27, §29 (1957)]
fixed a penalty for burglary but did not attempt
to define the term, and there were no Maryland
statutes regarding breaking and entering at variance with the common law crime, defendant was
charged with the common law crime of burglary;
that in absence of prior Maryland decisions in
point, the Court would look to the common law of

Statutory Construction-Crime Against Natur&
-State v. Bonanno, 163 So. 2d 72 (La. 1964).
Defendant was convicted of crime against natuie
for having had "unnatural carnal copulation" ivith
another man. On appeal, defendant contended that
the statute under which he was convicted [LA.
REv. STAT. §14:89] is unconstitutional in that it
is so vague and indefinite, particularly with regard
to the phrase "unnatural carnal copulation," that
the courts must supply the definition and thus
usurp a strictly legislative function, in contravention of LA. CONsT. art. II, §2. The Supreme Court
of Louisiana affirmed, holding that since the
phrase "unnatural carnal copulation" has a well
defined, well understood, and general-y accepted
meaning-i.e., "any and all carnal copulation or
sexual joining and coition that is devious and abnormal because it is contrary to the natural traits
and/or instincts intended by nature, and therefore
does not conform to the order ordained by nature,"
the statute under attack conformed to the rule
that a statute must be so definite and specific as
to the conduct prohibited that a reasonable man
can understand what acts are prohibited, inasmuch
as general terms of general understanding may be
used to so inform him; and consequently, the
statute was constitutional. The Court added, "To
meet the test of constitutionality it is not necessary
that the statute describe the loathsome and disgusting details connected with each and every way
in which 'unnatural carnal copulation' may be
accomplished."
Statutory Construction-Manslaughter-Lambert v. Comnwnwealth, 377 S.W.2d 76 (Ky. 1964).
Defendant was convicted of voluntary manslaughter. On appeal, defendant contended that the
trial court erred in failing to instruct the jury on

